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state conflicts; intrastate issues, such as subject matter jurisdiction and venue;
and conflicts in time, such as the applicability of prior or subsequent law within
a state. State and federal cases are discussed together because conflict of laws is
mostly a state-law topic, except for a few constitutional limits, resulting in the
same rules applying to most issues in state and federal courts. 1
Although no data are readily available to confirm this, Texas is no doubt a
primary state in the production of conflict-of-laws precedents. This results not
only from its size and population, but also from its placement bordering four
states and a civil-law nation, and its significant international trade volume. Texas
state and federal courts provide a fascinating study of conflicts issues every year,
but the volume of case law now greatly exceeds this Survey’s ability to report on
them, a function both of journal space and authors’ time. In addition, the
current Survey covers two years and will accordingly limit its review to a few
highlight cases and an examination of a couple of trends.
The most notable highlight is a non-Texas case, which is nevertheless
important because it comes from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
distinguishing the Circuit’s view on stream-of-commerce jurisdiction from the
U.S. Supreme Court’s recent plurality in 2011. 2 Choice-of-law cases include two
interesting trends, one good and one bad. The good trend is Texas courts’
increasingly sophisticated use—notably in tort cases—of the variety of subjectspecific sections in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. 3 The bad trend,
holding over from the 2012 Survey, is the number of courts acquiescing to
contractual choice of law clauses without the scrutiny required under Texas law
and the Restatement. 4 Along with these cases, the Survey-period produced a
number of notable holdings discussed below.
I. FORUM CONTESTS
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires amenability to
Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice. 5 Amenability may be established
by consent (usually based on a contract’s forum-selection clause), waiver (failing
to make a timely objection), or extraterritorial service of process under a Texas
long-arm statute. 6 Because most aspects of notice are purely matters of forum
law, 7 this Article will focus primarily on the issues relating to amenability.
Stream-of-commerce once again takes center stage, with nuanced opinions
continuing to muddy the waters but not changing the law. The 2012 Survey
article highlighted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, where the Court held New Jersey did not have personal
jurisdiction over an English manufacturer in a products liability action brought
1. For a thorough discussion of the choice-of-law function in federal courts, see RUSSELL J.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 722–72 (6th ed. 2010).
2. See infra notes 6–14.
3. See infra notes 162–78.
4. See infra notes 120–30.
5. James P. George et al., Conflict of Laws, 65 SMU L. REV. 391, 393 (2012) (discussing J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011)).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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by a man injured in New Jersey while using the manufacturer’s sole metalshearing machine sold in New Jersey through a U.S. distributor. 8 In 2013, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had to determine McIntyre’s impact on
the Circuit’s stream-of-commerce approach in an action originating in a
Mississippi federal court, reported here for its significance throughout the Fifth
Circuit.
Ainsworth v. Moffett Engineering, Ltd. was a products liability and wrongful
death action against an Irish forklift manufacturer, Moffett, which objected to
Mississippi jurisdiction for its lack of direct contacts with the forum. 9 The
district court rejected Moffett’s challenge but before appeal could be heard, the
Supreme Court handed down McIntyre, requiring the Fifth Circuit to reevaluate
its stream-of-commerce approach. 10 The Fifth Circuit’s approach had been that
minimum contacts are satisfied if the court “‘finds that the defendant delivered
the product into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it would be
purchased by or used by consumers in the forum state.’” 11 This requires only
foreseeability or awareness that the product will reach the forum, but “contacts
must be more than ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated, or of the unilateral
activity of another party of third person.’” 12
The crux of whether McIntyre would change the Fifth Circuit approach rested
on McIntyre’s plurality status, lacking a majority opinion or binding effect. 13
Although the Supreme Court’s careful reasoning was an opportunity for courts
to reconsider their analyses, the Fifth Circuit chose instead to look to the
narrowest grounds for reaching the conclusion. 14 The plurality opinion, written
by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, reasoned that a defendant has to target the forum and not merely
predict that its products will reach there.15 Because the Fifth Circuit’s stream-ofcommerce approach does not require targeting the forum, the court conceded
its approach did not meet the plurality’s requirement. 16 Noting, however, that
Justice Breyer did not join Justice Kennedy’s reasoning and instead concurred
merely by applying precedent to the facts, the Fifth Circuit distinguished the
Ainsworth facts. 17 While McIntyre’s rejection of New Jersey jurisdiction was based
on a single sale in the forum, Moffett’s distributor had sold 203 of its forklifts
worth $3,959,000.00 in Mississippi over a nearly ten-year span. 18
Just as McIntyre did not change the law, Ainsworth did not change the law in
the Fifth Circuit. The McIntyre plurality left existing stream-of-commerce
8. Id.
9. Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 644
(2013).
10. Id.; J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
11. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 177 (quoting Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374
(5th Cir. 1987).
12. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 177 (quoting ITL Int’l, Inc. v. Constenla, S.A., 669 F.3d 493, 498
(5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
13. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 176.
14. Id. at 178.
15. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788.
16. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 178.
17. Id. at 178–79.
18. Id. at 179.
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jurisprudence intact, and the Fifth Circuit took advantage of that, along with a
significant fact distinction, to keep its precedent intact. 19 With the Supreme
Court denying certiorari to Ainsworth in November 2013, 20 defendants who
hope for purposeful availment as the singular test for specific jurisdiction are no
closer to their wish.
A. FORUM CLAUSES
Contracting parties may agree to a forum-selection clause designating either
an optional or the exclusive site for litigation or arbitration. 21 When a
contracting party sues in the designated forum, the clause is said to be a
prorogation clause, that is, one supporting the forum’s jurisdiction over the
contractually-consenting defendant. 22 When a contracting party sues in a nonselected forum in violation of the contract, the clause is said to be a derogation
clause, that is, one undermining the forum’s jurisdiction. 23
1. Prorogating Forum Clauses
Even though prorogation clauses tend to be routine because they establish the
forum’s jurisdiction, 24 two Survey-period cases raise noteworthy interpretation
issues. In Bob Montgomery Chevrolet v. Dent Zone Cos., 25 the court rejected
plaintiff’s argument for an incorporation-by-reference forum clause. Dent, a
Texas business specializing in paintless auto dent repairs, contracted with
Kentucky-based Bob Montgomery Chevrolet (Montgomery) to be one of Dent’s
certified repair centers where Dent’s technicians would work on cars brought to
the Kentucky dealership. 26 When the relationship broke down, Dent sued
Montgomery in Texas for breach of contract. 27 The trial court found personal
jurisdiction based on Dent’s form contract which cross-referenced a Dent
website containing a forum selection clause. 28 The court of appeals reversed and
granted Montgomery’s special appearance, holding that the contract’s reference
to the website could not be treated as Montgomery’s intent to be bound by the
external agreement. 29
Bancroft Life & Casualty ICC, Ltd. v. FFD Resources III, LLC 30 was an unusual
instance where plaintiff’s primary claim was jurisdictionally valid in Texas, but

19. Id. at 177–79.
20. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd. v. Ainsworth, 134 S. Ct. 644 (2013).
21. PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 534 (5th ed. 2010).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. E.g., Office VP, LLC v. Ideal Health, Inc., No. A-11-CV-741 LY, 2012 WL 787041 (W.D.
Tex. Mar. 6, 2012) (contract’s designation of Texas as exclusive forum subjected New York
defendants to Texas jurisdiction in claim by website designer for unpaid service fees).
25. Bob Montgomery Chevrolet v. Dent Zone Cos., 409 S.W.3d 181, 193 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2013, no pet.).
26. Id. at 184–85.
27. Id. at 184–86.
28. Id. at 197.
29. Id. at 188–97.
30. Bancroft Life & Cas. ICC, Ltd. v. FFD Res. III, LLC, No. H-11-2382, 2012 WL 5032111
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2012).

2014]

Conflict of Laws

105

defendant’s counterclaim was not because it was subject to a mandatory forum
clause compelling litigation in St. Lucia, West Indies.31 Plaintiff’s claim was
distinguishable from defendant’s counterclaim because it was based on distinct
loan documents executed in Texas and governed by Texas law. 32
Although not discussing forum clauses as such, the court in Adhikari v. Daoud
& Partners 33 held that an indemnity contract subjects the indemnitor to the
indemnitee’s claim to enforce the agreement anywhere the indemnitee is sued. 34
2. DEROGATING CLAUSES
Courts generally enforce forum clauses naming another jurisdiction as the
exclusive site for litigation or arbitration.35 Two Survey-period cases show why
exclusive forum clauses may fail.
Steakley v. Round One Investments, L.P. 36 was an action for securities fraud
regarding Texas plaintiffs’ investment in a California enterprise. The investment
agreement included a mandatory California forum clause, but plaintiffs sued for
fraud in Texas. 37 The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss because
of the California clause, but the court of appeals reversed on a finding that the
claims did not fall within the forum clause’s scope. 38 Brown v. Mesa Distributors,
Inc., 39 arose from an equipment lease in which the lessee fell behind in
payments. The lease had a forum clause stating that lessee Brown consented to
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, but did not restrict either party to filing there.
When the lessor’s assignee sued in Texas to collect on overdue payments, the
trial court upheld Texas jurisdiction because the forum clause was permissive
rather than mandatory, and the court of appeals affirmed. 40
B. TEXAS LONG-ARM AND MINIMUM CONTACTS
Texas uses “limits-of-due-process” long-arm statutes, meaning that the
minimum contacts test is the only necessary foundation for personal jurisdiction
in Texas. 41 The Texas long-arm statutes also apply in Texas federal courts, except
31. Id. at *2.
32. Id. at *3. The opinion did not discuss whether the counterclaim was compulsory or
permissive, but it was possibly permissive because it was related to distinct agreements, though not
necessarily a distinct transaction.
33. Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2012 WL 718933, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5,
2012).
34. Id.
35. E.g., In re Counsel Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 13-12-00151-CV, 2013 WL 3895317, at *12 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi July 25, 2013, no pet.) (memo op., not designated for publication)
(dismissing in deference to New York choice-of-forum clause).
36. Steakley v. Round One Invs., L.P., No. 01-09-00022-CV, 2012 WL 3628800, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 23, 2012, no pet.) (memo op., not designated for publication).
37. Id. at *1.
38. Id. at *3–4. Accord Sunday Riley Modern Skin Care, LLC v. Maesa, No. H-12-1650, 2013
WL 5231860, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2013) (finding consumer claims against New York
cosmetics company fell outside of New York forum clause).
39. Brown v. Mesa Distribs., Inc., 414 S.W.3d 279, 281 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013,
no pet.).
40. Id. at 283–84.
41. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (West 2008).
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where Congress has enacted a federal long-arm statute for certain federal law
claims. 42
York v. Tropic Air, Ltd., 43 which provides the Survey-period’s most interesting
analysis, found general jurisdiction over a Belize-based airline for a 2008 air
crash in Belize that injured Texas residents. The court found general jurisdiction
based on Tropic Air’s extensive Texas contacts, all unrelated to the accident
which occurred in Belize. 44 The only related Texas contact was that plaintiffs
were Texas residents. 45 The court carefully examined the historical bases for
general jurisdiction in the Supreme Court’s only three opinions on the topic46
and contrasted Tropic Air’s strong Texas presence with the comparatively
weaker presence of the Columbia-based defendant (also an air-transport
business) in Helicopteros. 47 Curiously missing in the court’s opinion is any
reference to the Supreme Court’s recent “at home” standard for general
jurisdiction, which requires the defendant’s forum contacts be so pervasive that
defendant is essentially at home in the forum state. 48 On the other hand, the
court pointed out that Tropic Air’s chief executive officer had a home in
Texas, 49 which may be sufficient to meet the at-home standard.
In other cases, Texas state and federal courts found jurisdiction over a
Russian company regarding a trade secrets claim but not over a claim for
tortious interference; 50 a Kentucky company which ordered products from a
Texas manufacturer and failed to pay after delivery to Kentucky; 51 and a Florida
resident who was an officer of a Florida-based venture, in an action for fraud by
defendant’s co-investor who lived in Texas.52 Conversely, courts found no
jurisdiction over two of three defendants in a Houston-based company’s claim
for contract payments against Chinese companies with offices in Asia and
Europe, 53 a national fraternal organization for a dram shop claim arising from
alcohol served at a local affiliate chapter, 54 a Japanese company for failed
electronic component that caused automobile accidents based on uncontrolled

42. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
43. York v. Tropic Air, Ltd., No. V-10-55, 2012 WL 1077198 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2012).
44. Id. at *3–5.
45. Id. at *4.
46. Id. at *1–3 (discussing Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); and Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011)).
47. Tropic Air, 2012 WL 1077198, at *14.
48. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851; see also Akerblom v. Ezra Holdings, Ltd., 848 F. Supp. 2d
673 (S.D. Tex. 2012), aff’d, 509 F. App’x 340 (5th Cir. 2013) (no mention in trial court or appellate
opinions of the at-home standard in courts’ rejection of general jurisdiction over Singapore-based
companies for transactions centered there).
49. Tropic Air, 2012 WL 1077198, at *13.
50. Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 147–48 (Tex. 2013).
51. Betafence USA LLC v. Davis Distrib., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-1478-B, 2012 WL 5182909, at
*1, *7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2012).
52. Fairchild v. Barot, 946 F. Supp. 2d 573, 575–76 (N.D. Tex. 2013).
53. Solid Sys. CAD Servs. v. Total Risc Tech., Pty. Ltd., No. H-12-03176, 2013 WL 3787495,
at *5–6 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2013).
54. Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Haygood, 402 S.W.3d 776, 778–82 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2013, no pet.) (also rejecting plaintiff’s argument for alter-ego jurisdiction between the
national organization and its local affiliate).
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acceleration with twenty-four related cases consolidated in Houston, 55 a New
York non-profit for tort claims arising in Israel, 56 and a Georgia automotive
repair shop for negligence that caused a later accident in Texas. 57
C. FEDERAL LONG-ARM STATUTES AND NATIONWIDE CONTACTS
Texas long-arm statutes apply in both state and federal courts in Texas 58
except where Congress has enacted a federal long-arm statute 59 or where a
foreign defendant lacks jurisdictional contacts with any state but has sufficient
contacts with the United States as a whole. 60 Three notable Survey-period cases
were instructive about the reach and function of federal long-arm statutes.
Grynberg v. BP P.L.C. is the most intricate discussion, analyzing both the federal
long-arm and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 61 in denying jurisdiction
for claims related to failed business dealings for oil and gas development in
Kazakhstan. 62 United States ex rel. Tucker v. Christus Health 63 offers a proper
contrast to Grynberg’s detailed analysis with a quick-but-proper finding of
jurisdiction over Georgia-based medical facilities in a qui tam action. 64 The
plaintiff had worked only in Georgia. Although the Georgia defendants’ alleged
fraud was related to actions by Texas defendants, the court pointed out that the
only necessary finding was that the Georgia defendants had contacts with the
United States and that the lack of Texas contacts was irrelevant.65
SuperMedia, Inc. v. Foy 66 illustrated a third feature of federal long-arm
statutes—their limited scope. This was an employer’s declaratory judgment action
against retirees, seeking a declaration that its retirement plan amendments
complied with federal law under ERISA.67 Plaintiffs were a group of companies
with a common Texas base whose employee benefits plans were governed by
Texas law. 68 Several defendants (that is, employees or retirees) who did not live
or work in Texas challenged personal jurisdiction. The court held that ERISA’s
nationwide federal long-arm statute did not apply to the alleged facts and that

55. DENSO Corp. v. Hall, 396 S.W.3d 681, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no
pet.).
56. Weisskopf v. United Jewish Appeal-Fed’n of Jewish Philanthropies of N.Y., Inc., 889 F.
Supp. 2d 912, 916 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
57. Kawaja v. Crawford’s Auto Repair, 413 S.W.3d 194, 196 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no
pet.).
58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (k)(1)(A); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.02 (West 2008).
59. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(D).
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
61. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–11 (2012).
62. Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 855 F. Supp. 2d 625 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
63. United States ex rel. Tucker v. Christus Health, No. 09-1819, 2012 WL 5351212, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2012).
64. See id. at *1 n.1. Qui tam is a shortened form of a Latin term of art for false claims for
government reimbursement, governed by the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3732(a).
65. Tucker, 2012 WL 535121, at *2.
66. SuperMedia, Inc. v. Foy, No. 3:12-CV-2034-G, 2013 WL 4014453 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7,
2013).
67. Id. at *1. (ERISA stands for The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461. (2012 & Supp. I. 2013).
68. Id. at *9.
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jurisdiction over these non-resident employee-defendants was lacking, 69 which
shifted the analysis to traditional minimum contacts, which also did not capture
these defendants. 70
D. INTERNET-BASED JURISDICTION
A number of American jurisdictions, including Texas and the Fifth Circuit,
apply the Zippo sliding scale to assess personal jurisdiction based on Internet
contacts.71 The Survey-period produced several cases in which plaintiffs based
their jurisdictional argument significantly on Internet activity.
Although several cases involved routine Zippo analysis, 72 two cases indicated
the relevance of the websites’ related businesses, hotel reservations and higher
education to the contacts analysis. In Diem v. Quinn Hotel Praha, A.S., Texasresident Diem sued the owners of a hotel in Prague, Czech Republic, for injuries
suffered during her stay which she booked over the hotel’s website. 73 The court
found the website to be intermediate under Zippo and looked at the extent of
the site’s interactivity and the nature of the forum contacts. 74 First, the court
recognized the uniqueness of hotel reservation websites. 75 The court then found
no specific jurisdiction because Diem’s mere accessibility to a website did not
purposely direct its contact to Texas and Diem’s use of the website was not the
but-for causation of her injuries. 76
American University System, Inc. v. American University involved educational
institutions’ websites.77 Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment in Texas federal
court that it did not infringe on trademarks of a D.C. university and a West
Virginia distance learning instruction provider. 78 Under a general jurisdiction

69. Id. at *2–6 (interpreting the ERISA long arm statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2)).
70. Id. at *6–9.
71. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
The test breaks down Internet use into a spectrum of three areas. Id. One end of the spectrum finds
the defendant clearly doing business in the forum based on contracts repeatedly entered into with
forum residents; the spectrum’s other end is passive websites not involving the defendant’s
intentional contact with the forum and not leading to jurisdiction. Id. The spectrum’s difficult
middle involves the forum resident’s exchange of information with the defendant’s host computer,
and jurisdiction is based on the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the information
exchanged. Id. The Fifth Circuit adopted the Zippo test in Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333,
336 (5th Cir. 1999). Texas appellate courts have used it as well. See, e.g., Townsend v. Univ. Hosp.–
Univ. of Colo., 83 S.W.3d 913, 922 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied); Experimental
Aircraft Ass’n v. Doctor, 76 S.W.3d 496, 506-07 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
72. See York v. Tropic Air, Ltd., No. V-10-55, 2012 WL 1077198, at *3–16 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28,
2012); Driving Force Techs., Inc. v. Panda Distrib., Inc., No. 4:10-cv-24, 2012 WL 1645634, at *1–
8 (E.D. Tex. May 10, 2012); Kidwai v. St. Matthew’s Univ. Sch. of Med., No. H-12-455, 2012 WL
2403516, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2012); Ward v. Rhode, No. 6:11CV531, 2012 WL 4499307,
at *3–8 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2012); Knight Corp. v. Knight, 367 S.W.3d 715, 725–31 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Washington DC Party Shuttle, LLC v. IGuide Tours, 406
S.W.3d 723, 727–28, 731–39 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
73. Diem v. Quinn Hotel Praha, A.S., No. H-10-2848, 2012 WL 524182, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
15, 2012).
74. Id. at *2.
75. Id. at *3.
76. Id. at *2–4.
77. Am. Univ. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Univ., 858 F. Supp. 2d 705, 708 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
78. Id. at 708–09.
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inquiry, the court noted that activities typical of national prominent universities
are not contacts that subject educational institutions to jurisdiction. 79 The fact
that the defendants had intermediate websites that, among other activities
typical to universities, sold products to Texas residents did not subject the
defendants to general personal jurisdiction. 80
Perhaps the novelty, as well as the mystery, of the Internet has worn off for
the Fifth Circuit. In Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. Kg, a breach
of contract action, the court emphasized the jurisdictional inquiry can still be
completed using the traditional personal jurisdiction analysis. 81 Courts should
evaluate cases on a case-by-case basis, and the Zippo test simply aids the
determination of purposeful conduct. 82
E. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Forum non conveniens, or inconvenient forum, is an old common-law
objection to jurisdiction based on significant inconvenience to one or more
defendants. 83 It is also available by statute in the federal system and in many
states for intra-jurisdictional transfers that do not require dismissal. 84 Where
interstate or international case movement is involved, forum non conveniens is
truly jurisdictional because it involves the forum’s declining of otherwise-valid
jurisdiction, as well as the dismissal of the local case, for refiling in a distinct
forum. 85
Because intra-federal transfers under § 1404 do not implicate conflicts
between states or nations, they are not considered here, even though such
transfers may involve significant distances. This Article is limited to interjurisdictional forum non conveniens under the common law which is available
in state and federal courts in Texas under the same two-part test requiring the
movant to show the availability of an adequate alternative forum and that a
balancing of private and public interests favors transfer. 86
79. Id. at 713–14.
80. Id. at 712–16.
81. Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. Kg, 688 F.3d 214, 226–27 (5th Cir.
2012).
82. Id.
83. Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comperative View of The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in The United States, The United Kingdom, and Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J.,
455, 459–60 (1994).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) is the federal statutory provision for inconvenient forum
objections seeking transfer to another federal court. Texas law provides for in-state venue transfers
based on convenience under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(b) (West 2002).
85. 14 Sonja Larsen, et al., Tex. Jur. 3d Courts § 45 (1996 & Supp. 2014).
86. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 241 (1981); McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 424 (5th Cir. 2001). The
private factors look to the parties’ convenience and include the “relative ease of access to sources of
proof; [the] availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witness[es]; [the] possibility of view of premises, if . . . appropriate . . . ; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. (alterations
in original) (quoting Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 342 (5th Cir. 1999)).
The public factors look to the courts’ concerns and the forum state’s interests, and include the
“‘administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is
at home with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in

110

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 1

While the courts granted the majority of motions to dismiss for forum non
conveniens during the Survey-period, the Southern District of Texas denied a
dismissal for forum non conveniens, but it granted an alternative motion to stay
in one noteworthy case, MacDermid Offshore Solutions, LLC v. Niche Products,
LLC. 87 This case involved causes of action filed in both the Southern District of
Texas and the Patents County Court in England, with both actions having a
underlying allegation of fraud by two competing manufacturers and sellers of
hydraulic fluid, Niche Products Ltd, a British Company, and MacDermid, a
Delaware limited liability company with a place of business in Texas. 88 While
the district court found the English court both available and adequate, 89 the
court found that the resulting equal balance of relevant private and public
interest factors did not favor dismissal. 90 Although the district court
acknowledged the English court was an appropriate court to rule on the
paramount issue of fact, that is whether MacDermid’s two hydraulic fluids were
materially different from each other, the court was unwilling to grant
dismissal. 91 The court reasoned that if it granted dismissal and the English court
found the issue of fact in MacDermid’s favor, MacDermid would no longer have
access to the American courts to seek recompense although the favorable finding
of fact would indicate it would prevail in its claims in the district court.92
Consequently, the district court granted a stay to allow the English court to rule
and leave the American court’s door open for relief if the issue of fact favored
MacDermid. 93
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Transit Mix Concrete & Materials Co., 94 a
construction worker was injured at the Texarkana airport, located in Arkansas,
resulting in two lawsuits—Liberty Mutual’s subrogation claim for worker’s
compensation payments, filed in Texas, and the victim’s direct action filed in
Arkansas. In the Texas case, Transit Mix moved for a forum non conveniens
dismissal for refiling in Arkansas, which the trial court granted and Liberty
Mutual appealed. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed in an interesting
discussion of the distinction between statutory and common law forum non
conveniens, 95 and a thoroughly-explained choice of law decision that Arkansas
conflict of laws; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.’” Id.
Texas forum non conveniens law is multi-faceted. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051
(West 2008) applies to personal injury and wrongful death claims. Common-law forum non
conveniens, in line with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, governs all other interstate and international
forum convenience issues in Texas state courts. See In re Smith Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593, 596
(Tex. 1998).
87. MacDermid Offshore Solutions, LLC v. Niche Prods., LLC, No. 4:12-CV-2483, 2013 WL
3980870, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2013).
88. Id. at *1–2.
89. Id. at *8.
90. Id. at *9.
91. Id. at *10.
92. Id. at *9–10.
93. Id. at *10–11.
94. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Transit Mix Concrete & Materials Co., No. 96-12-00117-CV,
2013 WL 3329026, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 28, 2013, pet. denied).
95. In Texas, forum non conveniens issues regarding personal injury are statutory, see TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051 (West 2008), while generic commercial disputes are covered by
common law principles. Liberty Mut., 2013 WL 3329026, at *1. Transit Mix argued for common
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law governed the immediate subrogation issues. 96
Routine forum-non-conveniens analyses included dismissals in favor of courts
in (1) Israel regarding a partnership dispute; 97 (2) Peru for a wrongful death
action arising from an oil tanker explosion in Peruvian coastal waters; 98 (3) New
Zealand for a breach of warranties action arising from an acquisition
agreement; 99 (4) Canada for misappropriation of trade secrets in two related
actions; 100 and (5) Australia for a breach of contract action involving a joint
development agreement to exploit and sell in North America proprietary
software encryption technology owned by an Australian company. 101
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question, like personal
jurisdiction and judgment enforcement, involving both forum law and
constitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus on basic
principles. First, choice of law is a question of state law both in state and federal
courts. 102 Second, it is a question of forum law. Renvoi—the practice of using
another state’s choice-of-law rule—is almost never employed unless the forum
state directs it, and even then, the forum state remains in control. 103 Third, the
forum state has broad power to make choice-of-law decisions, either legislatively
or judicially, subject only to limited constitutional requirements. 104
Within the forum state’s control of choice of law is a hierarchy of choice-oflaw rules. At the top are legislative choice-of-law rules, that is, statutes directing
the application of a certain state’s laws, based on events or people important to
the operation of each specific law. 105 Second in the choice-of-law hierarchy is
law governance but the court held that the personal injury statute governed because the Texas
dispute was derivative of the Arkansas personal injury case. Id. at *1–2.
96. Consistent with the well-done opinions noted in the tort choice of law section below, the
court applied the Restatement’s sections 145 (the general tort principle), 146 (personal injury), as
well as section 6’s most significant relationship test. See id. at *3–8.
97. SES Prods., Inc. v. Aroma Classique, LLC, No. 01-12-00219-CV, 2013 WL 2456797 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 6, 2013, no pet.).
98. In re BPZ Res., Inc., 359 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, orig.
proceeding [mand. denied]).
99. Royal Ten Cate USA, Inc. v. TTAH Trust Co., No. A-11-CA-1057 LY, 2013 WL 56151
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2013).
100. Logan Int’l, Inc. v. 1556311 Alberta Ltd., 929 F. Supp. 2d 625 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Logan
Int’l Inc. v. SureTech Completions (USA), Inc., No. H-13-0492, 2013 WL 3005592 (S.D. Tex. June
10, 2013).
101. K2M3, LLC v. Cocoon Data Holding Pty. Ltd., No. 13-11-00194-CV, 2012 WL 2469705
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 28, 2012, pet. denied).
102. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941).
103. The Restatement (Second) creates a presumption against renvoi except for limited
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1971). Although
commentators defend the limited use of renvoi, they acknowledge its general lack of acceptance in
the United States except in limited circumstances, usually found in statutes directing the use of
renvoi. See HAY ET AL., supra note 21, at 162–68; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 102–09. Texas law
provides for renvoi in specified sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. See TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 1.301(b) (West 2009) (identifying nine sections in which Texas courts must look to
the choice of law rule of another state). For federal courts, Klaxon reiterates the forum state’s
control of choice of law. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496–97.
104. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1), cmt. a (1971); see, e.g., Owens
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party-controlled choice of law, that is, choice-of-law clauses in contracts that
control unless public policy dictates otherwise. 106 Third in the hierarchy is the
common law, now controlled in Texas by the most significant relationship test
of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 107 This Survey article is
organized according to this hierarchy, that is, statutory choice of law, followed by
choice-of-law clauses, and concluding with choice of law under the most
significant relationship test. This grouping of cases results in a discussion that
mixes Texas Supreme Court opinions with those of Texas intermediate appellate
courts, federal district courts, and the Fifth Circuit. In spite of this mix, readers
should of course note that to the extent choice of law is a state issue (that is,
except for constitutional issues), the only binding opinions are those of the
Texas Supreme Court. 108
A. STATUTORY CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
Statutory choice-of-law rules express a public policy interest that overrides the
multi-factor considerations in typical choice-of-law analyses or the party
autonomy principal in contract disputes. Some choice-of-law statutes compel the
application of Texas law and some the application of another state’s or nation’s
law. In each case, the application of law is based on a designated event or
relationship deemed paramount.
A common example of a statute designating forum law is the Texas Insurance
Code, which directs the application of Texas law to any insurance contract
payable to “any citizen or inhabitant of this state by any insurance company or
corporation doing business within this State.” 109 Preferred Contractors Insurance
Co. Risk Retention Group, LLC v. Oyoque Masonry, Inc., 110 an insurer’s declaratory
judgment action for non-coverage of a truck driver’s injury, is a good example of
Texas law displacing the contract’s chosen law on an issue of interpretation.
Finnels was a truck driver who worked as an independent contractor for Gulf
Coast Express, a company owned by Jose Oyoque, who also owned Oyoque
Masonry, Inc. (OMI). 111 Finnels was injured while unloading a concrete wall,
built by OMI, which Finnels was delivering to the installation site. The opinion
provides no geographic information, but the setting is apparently Texas where
Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of the Texas
wrongful death statute requiring the court to “apply the rules of substantive law that are
appropriate under the facts of the case”) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031
(West 2008) (as amended in 1997 with the same wording as this provision)).
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1988) (Law of the State
Chosen by the Parties) (allowing contracting parties to choose a governing law, within defined
limits). Texas has adopted § 187. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677–78 (Tex.
1990).
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (listing the seven
balancing factors for the most significant relationship test).
108. The exception is when a court rules on a constitutional issue, such as legislative
jurisdiction or full faith and credit. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray, 135 S.W.3d 657,
680 (Tex. 2004) (legislative jurisdiction); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Chi. Bridge &
Iron Co., 406 S.W.3d 326 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. denied) (full faith and credit).
109. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (West 2009).
110. Preferred Contractors Ins. Co. Risk Retention Grp., LLC v. Oyoque Masonry, Inc., No.
4:12-CV-1406, 2013 WL 3899332 (S.D. Tex. July 26, 2013).
111. Id. at *1.
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OMI is based 112 and where two lawsuits were filed related to Finnels’s injury.
Finnels filed the first action in a Texas state court in Galveston, suing Gulf
Coast and OMI. 113 When OMI’s insurer, Preferred Contractors, refused to
defend or indemnify OMI in the Galveston suit, OMI filed this action in a
federal court in Houston. 114 Preferred Contractors had declined coverage based
on the insurance contract’s exclusion of employment-based claims, including
those of independent contractors like Finnels. 115 OMI argued that the insurance
contract was governed by its designated Montana law, under which Finnels’s
employment relationship was limited to Gulf Coast, making him a covered
third-party in relation to OMI. 116 The federal court found this to be a
straightforward application of the Texas Insurance Code’s directive (further
indicating a Texas setting for the injury) and used Texas law to interpret
coverage in Preferred’s favor. 117
In contrast to forum-directed statutes, the internal affairs doctrine is an
example of a statute designating what is often non-forum law for claims based on
a corporation’s internal affairs. 118 U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Verizon
Communications, Inc. 119 involved claims against Verizon and others for breach of
fiduciary duty and promoter liability. In 2006 Verizon spun off its domestic
directories business to create Idearc, Inc. When Idearc failed and filed for
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court appointed U.S. Bank as litigation trustee to
pursue claims against Verizon and others involved in Idearc’s founding and
alleged wrongs afterward. 120 On the claims of breach of fiduciary duty and
promoter liability, the litigation trustee argued that the most-significantrelationship test dictated the application of New York or Texas law which
supported the trustee’s claims. 121 Verizon successfully countered that the Texas
choice-of-law rule was trumped by the Texas statute codifying the internal affairs
doctrine which invalidated trustee’s argument on these claims. 122
Barrash v. American Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc. 123 illustrates that not
every internal dealing falls under the internal affairs doctrine. Plaintiff Barrash is
a medical doctor in Illinois who was cited for professional misconduct by

112. Id.
113. Id. at *1 n.2.
114. Id. at *1.
115. Id. at *1–2.
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id. Without analyzing Montana law, the court also speculated that the result would not
differ under Montana law. Id.
118. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.102 (West 2012).
119. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 2d 805 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
120. Id. at 807.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 827–28; see also Collins v. Sydow (In re NC12, Inc.), 478 B.R. 820 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2012) (applying Nevada law as the incorporating state to determine whether the shareholders’
claims were theirs to raise in a collateral action or were direct injuries assertable only by the debtor
company); ExxonMobil Global Servs. Co. v. Gensym Corp., No. 1:12-CV-442-JDR, 2013
WL1314461 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2013) (applying Delaware law to determine the alter ego issue
between defendant Gensym and its parent corporation which plaintiff sought to add as defendant).
123. Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-1054, 2013 WL 4401429
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2013).
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defendant American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS). 124 When
Barrash lost an internal appeal within AANS, he sued AANS for breach of
contract and related tort claims. 125 Responding to AANS’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, Barrash argued that his contract claim under AANS’s
bylaws should be governed by Illinois law as the state of AANS’s
incorporation. 126 The court rejected this, explaining that in this instance the
bylaws operated as a contract with plaintiff, a non-board member. 127 This shifted
the analysis from the internal affairs doctrine to the Restatement’s section 301
which called for the application of the law with the most significant relationship
to the dispute, which the court found to be Texas as the place where the
pertinent facts and possible injury occurred.128
Some areas of law have both forum-directed and foreign-directed choice-of-law
statutes. One example is child support, which falls under both state and federal
statutes governing several issues. This can result in contrasting policies where the
controlling state may be the one issuing the original child support order or the
state currently enforcing that order. In re Lamar 129 was a claim by the Texas
attorney general in bankruptcy court, seeking to exempt from discharge the
interest the debtor allegedly owed on back child support. The child support was
originally ordered in Florida in 1979. When debtor Lamar moved from Florida
to Texas, he fell behind in child support payments which in 1996 resulted in a
Texas judgment under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). 130
The court noted that since his earlier arrearage, Lamar had paid the back
support and kept it current—the dispute was over interest allegedly accrued,
which varied according to which state’s law controlled. 131 In managing the
UIFSA judgment over the years, the State of Texas calculated interest at the
twelve percent rate under Texas law. 132 The bankruptcy court deemed this error
because of the Texas Family Code’s choice-of-law rule requiring that interest on
foreign child support judgments be calculated under Florida law as the state
issuing the original judgment. Under the proper Florida calculation, Lamar’s
payments exceeded his obligation, and the court thus denied the claim by the
State of Texas. 133
Norman v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. 134 offers a different choice-of-law
result on a child support issue. Norman’s complaint was that Experian was
reporting delinquent child support obligations that were more than seven years
old and thus exempt from credit reports under federal law. 135 According to
124. Id. at *1.
125. Id. at *1–2.
126. Id. at *1.
127. Id. at *6.
128. Id. at *5–6.
129. In re Lamar, No. 1234034, 2012 WL 5985324 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2012).
130. Id. at *1–2, *3 n.1 (citing the Texas UIFSA, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 159.001–.901
(West 2008)).
131. Id. at *3–4.
132. Id. at *4.
133. Id. at *5.
134. Norman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-128-B, 2013 WL 1774625 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 25, 2013).
135. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1681c(a)(4) (West 2009).
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Norman, the original support orders were from Shelby County, Tennessee and
were later domesticated in Illinois when Norman moved there. 136 After several
complaints to Experian starting in 2008, Norman eventually sued Experian for
false credit reporting under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 137 The issue was
whether subsequently-issued child support judgments were new judgments and
thus reportable, or judgments that became unreportable after seven years. 138
Norman argued that Tennessee law controlled as the original issuing state and
that under Tennessee law the judgments were not new. 139 Illinois law, on the
other hand, treated each successive judgment as new and thus still reportable. 140
Applying a federal choice-of-law rule under the full-faith-and-credit statute
governing child support, the court ruled that Illinois law governed because it was
the state of Norman’s residence and thus the enforcing state. 141
Texas family law also offers an example of a forum-directed statute. Tener v.
Short Carter Morris, LLP was a legal malpractice claim arising from a Texas
divorce involving a Colorado husband. 142 Tener’s wife had moved to Houston
where she filed for divorce. 143 Tener hired the defendant law firm to represent
him in the Texas case and afterward sued for malpractice. Among other claims,
Tener argued that his lawyers failed to offer the court adequate proof of
Colorado law regarding Tener’s claim to marital property. 144 In making this
argument, Tener relied on a line of Texas cases that were superseded in 2003
when the Texas legislature amended the Family Code to provide that Texas law
governs the characterization of property acquired by a spouse in another state. 145
The trial court ruled for defendant law firm on this issue and the court of
appeals affirmed. 146
Logic suggests that statutes based on uniform laws would not require choiceof-law provisions, and as is often true, logic fails in legal reasoning. In BMW
Financial Services, N.A., LLC v. Rio Grande Valley Motors, Inc., 147 BMW sued to
foreclose on secured property held by two car dealerships in McAllen, Texas.
The court applied a Texas UCC choice-of-law statute subjecting the perfection
of security interests to the law of the state of the debtor’s location, 148 which in
turn is defined as the state where the debtor is organized. 149 Because the dealer
136. Norman, 2013 WL 1774625, at *4. The facts are vague because Norman, a pro se plaintiff,
argued several choice-of-law points without supporting evidence, including arguing for Tennessee as
the originating forum. Id. at *4 n.2. The court assumed the validity of Norman’s assertions as a
basis of ruling against him.
137. Id. at *3. Norman also sued the Illinois official in charge of child support collections.
138. Id. at *5.
139. Id. at *4.
140. Id. at *4–5.
141. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738(b)(1) (West 2005)).
142. Tener v. Short Carter Morris, LLP, No. 01-12-00676-CV, 2013 WL 4007802 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 6, 2013, no pet.).
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id. at *9 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.002(b) (West 2006)).
147. BMW Fin. Servs., N.A., LLC v. Rio Grande Valley Motors, Inc., No. M-11-292, 2012 WL
4623198 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2012).
148. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(1) (West 2011).
149. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.307(e) (West Supp. 2013).
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was a Delaware corporation, that state’s law governed issues regarding
perfection. 150
B. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law rule, Texas courts apply the most
significant relationship test, a seven-factor balancing test from the
Restatement. 151
1. Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contracts
Texas law and the Restatement permit contracting parties to choose a
governing law, 152 which is reflected in forty-eight Survey-period cases. Thirty-five
of those cases involve the courts’ summary acquiescence to the parties’ choice of
law with little or no analysis, a judicial practice also noted in the 2012 Conflicts
Survey. 153 It may be tempting to accept this practice with the idea that the
parties’ choice should be presumed valid, especially in the absence of a party’s
objection and adequate opposing argument. The Restatement, however, makes
it clear that parties’ contractual choices of law do not control unless (1) the
choice bears a reasonable relationship to the dispute, and (2) the result does not
contravene a fundamental interest of a jurisdiction with a materially greater
interest. Case law in both Texas 154 and federal 155 courts adopt the Restatement’s
structured view.
One of the acquiescing opinions offers insight into a source for the error,
which not surprisingly is an earlier opinion misstating the law. Yesh Music v.
Lakewood Church 156 was a copyright infringement action alleging that a Houstonbased religious broadcaster exceeded the parties’ licensing agreement on certain
songs. The license designated British Columbia law as controlling. 157 The court
appropriately noted that as a copyright claim, this was a federal question that
150. BMW Fin. Servs., 2012 WL 4623198, at *8.
151. The embodiment of the most significant relationship test are within the seven factors to be
balanced according to the needs of the particular case. They are: “(a) the needs of the interstate and
international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue; (d) the protection of justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law; (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and (g) ease in the determination
and application of the law to be applied.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)
(1971). This listing is not by priority, which varies from case to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense,
the most significant relationship test includes the other choice-of-law sections throughout the
Restatement.
152. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
153. See George, et al., supra note 5, at 409–10. The thirty-five cases, on file with the authors,
comprise twenty-seven cases from federal district courts in Texas and eight cases from Texas
intermediate state appellate courts.
154. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677–81.
155. Provident Fin., Inc. v. Strategic Energy L.L.C., 404 Fed. App’x 835, 839 (5th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (citing Int’l Interests, L.P. v. Hardy, 448 F.3d 303, 306–07 (5th Cir. 2006); Griffin v.
BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. H-09-03842, 2011 WL 675285, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16,
2011) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971)).
156. Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, No. 4:11-CV-03095, 2012 WL 524187 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
14, 2012).
157. Id. at *4.
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invoked a choice-of-law rule from federal common law rather than the local
state’s rule, and federal common law used the Restatement. 158 The court then
drew from a 1997 Fifth Circuit opinion—Mitsui & Co. (USA) Inc. v. Mira M/V—
that “choice-of-law clauses are presumatively valid.” 159 The Mitsui opinion took
the error further, stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has consistently held forumselection and choice-of-law clauses presumptively valid,” citing four cases in
support, all dealing with forum-selection clauses and none dealing with choiceof-law clauses. 160 Further analysis requires more space than the Survey affords,
but the correct view is stated in both Fifth Circuit and Texas Supreme Court
opinions cited above.161 The Yesh opinion did attempt a Restatement analysis,
finding that the transaction had a reasonable relationship to British
Columbia. 162 But in doing so, the opinion confused Restatement sections
187(1) and 187(2). Section 187(1) allows contracting parties to designate a
controlling law for any issues that could have been resolved explicitly in the
contract and does not require a reasonable relationship between the chosen law
and the facts underlying the contract. 163 Section 187(2), on the other hand, sets
the guidelines for contracting parties designating a law for issues that could not
have been explicitly resolved in the contract and imposes the reasonable
relationship test, along with not contravening the fundamental interests of a
state with a greater relationship. 164 In basing its analysis on section 187(1), the
opinion also failed to identify the issue that the parties could have resolved in
the contract.165
Two of the Survey-period’s best examples of contract-clause analysis are in
personal injury cases with collateral contract issues. Williams-Smith v. Designers
Edge, Inc. 166 offers a textbook application of Restatement sections 187 and 188,
negating the parties’ chosen law for violating Washington law. The underlying
case was an action to recover damages for burns from the explosion of a halogen
work lamp at a work site in Texas. 167 The accident killed one worker and
158. Id. at *3.
159. Id. (citing Mitsui & Co. (USA) Inc. v. Mira M/V, 111 F.3d 33, 35 (5th Cir 1997)).
160. Mitsui, 111 F.3d at 35 (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515
U.S. 528 (1995)); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); M/S Bremen v. Zapata
Off–Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Kevlin Servs., Inc. v. Lexington State Bank, 46 F.3d 13 (5th Cir.
1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
161. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
162. Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, No. 4:11-CV-03095, 2012 WL 524187, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 14, 2012).
163. See DCS Sanitation Mgmt., Inc. v. Castillo, 475 F.3d 892, 896–97 (8th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the difference between RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187(1),
187(2)).
164. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677–81 (Tex. 1990) (discussing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)).
165. Yesh Music, 2012 WL 524187, at *3. Two Survey–period cases did a partly correct lawclause analysis, in each case requiring the adequate relationship between the dispute and the
chosen law, but failing to require a showing that the chosen law did not contravene a fundamental
interest of a state with a greater interest. Gernsbacher v. Campbell (In re Equip. Equity Holdings,
Inc.), 491 B.R. 792 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2013); In re Texas Rangers Baseball Partners, No. 10-43400DML, 2012 WL 4464550 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2012).
166. Williams-Smith v. Designers Edge, Inc., No. G–10–590, 2012 WL 1201926 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
10, 2012).
167. Id. at *1.
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severely burned two others. 168 After the accident, the lamp’s manufacturer—
Designers Edge—sold its assets to Coleman Cable, Inc. (Coleman) with an asset
purchase agreement designating Illinois law as controlling. Ordinarily that
contract’s impact would rest only on Designers Edge and Coleman. 169 But in
this case, the plaintiffs—third parties to the contract—sought successor liability
from purchaser Coleman, and the acquisition agreement controlled that
issue.170 Coleman moved for summary judgment on the grounds that both
Texas forum law and the contract’s designated Illinois law made them
immune. 171 Washington law did not, under the “product line exception” apply
to asset transfers, which Washington recognized and the other states did not. 172
Plaintiffs argued that Washington law controlled as the home state of Designers
Edge and the locale of the sale to Coleman. 173 In an excellent analysis of
Restatement sections 187 and 188, the court ruled that Washington had greater
interest than either Texas (the forum state and accident situs) or Illinois (the
contract’s designated law), thus rejecting Coleman’s motion for summary
judgment.174
CMA-CGM (America), Inc. v. Empire Truck Lines, Inc. 175 was an action for
personal injury and indemnity regarding a truck driver’s injury when a new
chassis was being attached to his truck. Acquire, the driver, sued Empire (his
employer) and CMA (the chassis owner). CMA filed a cross-claim against
Empire under the Uniform Intermodal Interchange and Facilities Access
Agreement, which CMA argued required Empire to defend and indemnify
CMA.176 The Intermodal Agreement had a Maryland choice-of-law clause. After
Acquire settled with CMA and Empire, the trial court granted summary
judgment to Empire, finding that CMA’s defense/indemnity claim was not
enforceable. 177 CMA won reversal on appeal, arguing that the trial court failed
to apply Maryland law as chosen by the parties. 178 As part of the appeal, Empire
raised the point (not argued below) that Maryland law violated the Texas
Transportation Code’s limitations on indemnity provisions, which it argued was
a fundamental Texas policy. 179 The court of appeals declined to rule on that
argument but directed that it be considered on retrial. On remand, the trial
court again ruled for Empire on a finding that Maryland law contravened Texas

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *1–2.
173. Id. at *2.
174. Id. at *3–4. In a subsequent ruling on Coleman’s claim of indemnity against Designers
Edge, the court found false conflict among Washington, Texas, and Illinois because this indemnity
claim would be recognized in all three states. See Williams-Smith v. Designers Edge, Inc., No. G-1000590, 2012 WL 6554372 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2012).
175. CMA-CGM (Am.), Inc. v. Empire Truck Lines, Inc., No. 01-12-00354-CV, 2013 WL 3422666
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2013, no pet.).
176. Id. at *1.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at *2 (referring to TEX. TRANS. CODE ANN. § 623.0155 (West 2011)).
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policy as codified in the Transportation Code. 180 In a careful application of
DeSantis, the court of appeals affirmed, finding that Maryland law contravened a
fundamental Texas policy and that Texas had a materially greater interest than
Maryland. 181
Solotko v. LegalZoom.com, Inc. 182 is a good example of a choice-of-law clause
affecting class action formation. It further shows the importance of a
Restatement section187 analysis that a contractually-designated law cannot be
applied without considering the possibly greater interests of other affected
jurisdictions. This was an attempted class action for overcharged filing fees on a
trademark application website. During the pertinent time period it was possible
to file under two federal trademark laws, one with a $275 fee and the other a
$325 fee. Legalzoom’s website stated that the government filing fee was $325 for
both. 183 Solotko filed a nationwide class action in a Texas state court, alleging
violations under California law which Legalzoom’s contract with its users (the
putative class) identified as controlling. 184 In denying class formation, the court
explained the burden on the party proposing the class to furnish information on
the laws of all affected states where members live. 185 Even though there was a
contractual choice-of-law clause arguably governing defendant’s conduct, the
court explained that the potential governing law does not do away with the
requirement of conducting a fifty-state analysis to see if the chosen law violates
other states’ fundamental policies. 186
Giner v. Estate of Higgins 187 was a claim by an attorney and an accountant for
their contractual fees for the title transfer of a manufacturing site in Juarez,
Mexico. The transfer was from one corporation to another, both owned by
Higgins. Plaintiffs, an accountant and a lawyer and both Mexican citizens, sued
to collect fees for their participation in a series of title transfers. 188 The series of
transactions (allegedly fraudulent, which is irrelevant here), began in 2004. 189
Higgins died in 2009 without paying plaintiffs, who sued his estate and another
defendant in 2011. 190 The disputed agreement on which plaintiffs claimed fees
designated the “Laws of the United Mexican States” as controlling. Ruling on
summary judgment motions from all parties, the court noted the distinction
between Mexican federal law and the law of the State of Chihuahua, and further
noted that in Mexico, commercial matters such as this one are governed by
federal law. 191 Applying the Restatement, the court found that Mexican law had
180. Id. at *3.
181. Id. at *9–17 (applying DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990)).
182. Solotko v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 03-10-00755-CV, 2013 WL 3724770 (Tex. App.—Austin
July 11, 2013, pet. denied).
183. Id. at *1 (referring to the Trademark Electronic Application Service (TEAS, a $275 fee)
and the TEAS Plus (a $325 fee)).
184. Id. at *1 n.1.
185. Id.
186. Id. at *4–7.
187. Giner v. Estate of Higgins, No. EP-11-CV-126-KC, 2012 WL 123973 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 13,
2012).
188. Id. at *1.
189. Id.
190. Id. at *3.
191. Id. at *5.
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a reasonable relationship to the dispute, that the applicable law was not contrary
to a fundamental policy of Texas, and that Mexican law favored plaintiffs’
recovery. 192
Justice Hecht’s opinion in DeSantis is the model for law-clause analyses in
Texas. DeSantis rejected a Florida law clause that validated a non-compete
agreement for services performed in Houston. 193 Two non-compete cases during
the Survey-period also provide choice-of-law clause analysis, each case choosing
Texas law over the chosen laws of New York 194 and Delaware. 195
Two cases gave examples of the interaction of choice-of-law clauses with
federal law. Dyna Torque Technologies, Inc. v. Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., an
action for breach of contract and related tort claims regarding an offshore
pipeline construction project, held that a choice of law agreement could not
create a federal question. 196 Diamond Offshore Co. v. Survival Systems International,
Inc., an action for injuries in an oil rig accident attributed to defendant’s faulty
equipment, held that a choice-of-law clause cannot divest federal preemption. 197
Considered together, Diamond Offshore and Dyna Torque provide bookend rules
that choice-of-law clauses neither create nor destroy federal questions. 198
Other valuable points raised during the Survey-period include that in
addition to preemption by another state’s fundamental interests, choice-of-law
clauses may be preempted by federal law, 199 and that disclaimers in employee
handbooks stating that the handbooks are not contracts may invalidate the
handbooks’ designation of law. 200

192. Id. at *5–13. As to the reasonable relation, the court recited that the agreement was
entered in Mexico for a sale of property in Mexico, several of the parties were Mexican citizens, and
contained confidentiality obligations to non-contracting entities in Mexico. As to Mexican law not
contradicting a more-interested state’s fundamental interests, the court simply noted that none of
the parties had argued that. Id. at *4.
193. DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990).
194. Drennan v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 367 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013)
(employment contract’s “detrimental activity” clause was impermissible non-compete agreement
under Texas law), rev’d, No. 12-0621, 2014 WL 4782974 (Tex. Aug. 29, 3014) (finding uniformity a
worthy goal under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and a logical rationale for
choosing New York law, and such choice did not contravene fundamental policy in Texas).
Reversal came after Survey period.
195. Heritage Operating, L.P. v. Rhine Bros., LLC, No. 02-10-00474-CV, 2012 WL 2344864
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 21, 2012, no pet.) (court of appeals reversed the trial court’s
application of the contract-designated Delaware law regarding a non-compete agreement because
Texas had a materially greater interest).
196. Dyna Torque Techs., Inc. v. Helix Energy Solutions Grp., Inc., No. 4:12-CV-1529, 2013
WL 1204927 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2013). The court added the point that until the court had subject
matter jurisdiction, it lacked authority to determine which law governed the claims, and that the
parties obviously could not confer that jurisdiction on their own. Id. at *4.
197. Diamond Offshore Co. v. Survival Sys. Int’l, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 2d 912, 935–40 (S.D. Tex.
2012).
198. See Dyna Torque, 2013 WL 1204927; Diamond Offshore, 902 F. Supp. 2d 912.
199. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Munn & Assocs., Ltd., 392 S.W.3d 839, 843 n.2 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (choice of law clause preempted by the contract’s arbitration clause and
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14(2012)).
200. Little v. Technical Specialty Prods., LLC, No. 4:11-CV-717, 2012 WL 695719, at *3 n.2
(E.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2012). The court further found that even though the handbook’s choice of law
clause was invalid as such, that Louisiana law might nonetheless govern the employer’s claim to
force arbitration. Id. at *4.
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2. Contracts Not Designating a Governing Law
The Survey-period produced only two contract cases not involving a choice-oflaw clause, compared with forty-eight involving law clauses. Two reasons for the
disparity come to mind, one good, one bad, neither provable. The good reason
is that more contracts now include law clauses. The bad reason is that parties
litigating multi-jurisdictional claims on contracts lacking law clauses do not
routinely consider raising a choice-of-law issue.
Both cases involved inadequate responses to motions to dismiss, one at the
law level and the second at the factual level. The two cases were well-analyzed by
the respective courts and bear mentioning here only because of the lessons in
various parties’ inadequate advocacy.
Murthy v. Abbott Laboratories 201 was a pharmaceutical products liability action
raising both contract and tort claims. Abbott moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and made its argument under Texas law. 202 Although all the
pertinent facts were centered in Texas—plaintiff’s residence from first dosage
through follow-up treatment—plaintiff’s response was that she would assume
arguendo that Texas law applied, and she raised no other choice-of-law
arguments. 203 In spite of plaintiff’s weak response, the court thoroughly listed
the Restatement factors governing tort and contract claims, then in one
paragraph listed the Texas contacts that supported applying Texas law under
which plaintiff’s contract action survived but her tort claim did not.204 The one
paragraph was adequate in light of the absence of contrary argument or facts,
but was unnecessary in light of the presumption that forum law governs absent
any showing to the contrary. 205
National Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Elite Coil Tubing Solutions, LLC 206 was a contract
action for failure to pay for pipe, but the issue at bar was defendant’s
counterclaim for faulty pipe. National Oilwell, the pipe seller, is headquartered
in Louisiana and Elite Tubing is based in Texas where the damage occurred. 207
Elite Tubing alleged its claims under Louisiana contract and tort law, and
National Oilwell moved to dismiss with the argument that Texas law controlled
and did not support Elite Tubing’s claims. 208 Unlike Murthy’s acquiescence on
Abbott Labs’ choice of law argument, Elite argued for Louisiana law under
Restatement section 188, that is, supporting the contract but not the tort
claims. 209 The court noted that Elite’s counterclaims sounded in tort and then

201. Murthy v. Abbott Labs., 847 F. Supp. 2d 958 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
202. Id. at 965–67.
203. Id. at 967. Plaintiff apparently now lives in Massachusetts. See id. at 964 n.2.
204. Id. at 966–67.
205. TEX. R. EVID. 202 allows a Texas court to take judicial notice of sister states’ laws on its
own motion and requires it to do so upon a party’s motion, but parties must supply “sufficient
information” for the court to comply. See, e.g., Ogletree v. Crates, 363 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. 1963)
(applying TEX. R. CIV. P. 184a, the predecessor to TEX. R. EVID. 202).
206. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Elite Coil Tubing Solutions, LLC, No. 4:13-cv-00374, 2013
WL 4735574 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2013).
207. Id. at *3.
208. Id. at *2.
209. Id.
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examined the pertinent Restatement sections for both tort and contract.210
None of the court’s work mattered, though, because neither party had argued
sufficient supporting facts to enable the court to apply the Restatement often
place-centered factors. 211 Because of the factual inadequacies, the court denied
National Oilwell’s motion without prejudice.212
3. Torts
Choice-of-law in tort cases is directed by Restatement section 145, a fourfactor test prioritizing (1) the injury situs, (2) the conduct situs, (3) the parties’
“domicile residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business,”
and (4) the situs of the parties’ relationship, if any. 213 Section 145 is augmented
by forty additional tort sections addressing specific claims such as fraud, 214 or
issues common to torts such as standard of care. 215 As noted in the
introduction, Texas case law is showing a better application of these
Restatement sections. 216 This is not to say that opinions failing to use those
sections reach an incorrect result or that the use of those sections is necessary for
the correct results. It is to say that the Restatement is structured with
presumptions keyed to specific claims or issues, and the use of those
presumptions adds a good measure of the predictability inherent in the First
Restatement and its lex loci rules. Application of these presumptions could dispel
criticisms of the most-significant relationship test’s reputation for
unpredictability.
Sulak v. American Europcoter Corp. 217 offers the most thorough analysis in the
Survey-period and shows the proper analytical sequence for Restatement
analysis. Sulak died in a helicopter crash in Hawaii and his survivors sued the
helicopter’s French manufacturer and Texas owner. 218 The court first rejected
arguments for Hawaii law as governing subsequent remedial measures and
defendants’ wish to implead a third party; both were procedural issues governed
by forum law, in this case federal. 219 As to the case’s substantive issues, the court
noted the presumption in Restatement sections 175 and 178 favoring the
accident’s situs law for wrongful death unless another law has a more significant
relationship.220 Applying Restatement sections 145 and then 6, the court
considered Texas law (argued by defendants) and French law (which the parties
neither argued nor presented evidence for), and chose Hawaii law as the
accident’s situs.221
210. Id. at *3 n.2. The court discussed Restatement section 188 for contracts, and sections 6,
145, and 147 (injury to land) for the tort claims. Id. at *2–3.
211. Id. at *3.
212. Id. at *3–5.
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
214. Id. § 148.
215. Id. § 157.
216. See supra text accompanying note 3.
217. Sulak v. Am. Europcoter Corp., 901 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
218. Id. at 837.
219. Id. at 838–41.
220. Id. at 842.
221. Id. at 842–46.
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In spite of Sulak’s accurate disposition of its procedural issues as governed by
forum law, there are times when party joinder and indemnity are governed by
another state’s law. 222 Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. Neese 223 is a good
example how intervention can have a greater mix of underlying substantive law.
The case was a wrongful death claim from a pipeline explosion in Texas, where
the decedent and his employer were from Oklahoma but several other
defendants were from Texas. 224 The Dallas Court of Appeals applied
Restatement sections 145 and 185 to decide that Oklahoma law governed
intervention because of the insurer’s relation with the decedent’s employer. 225
Engine Components, Inc. v. A.E.R.O. Aviation Co. 226 did the same with
indemnity. This was the crash of a Cessna aircraft in Wisconsin which killed
three Wisconsin residents. 227 As a corollary to a wrongful death claim in Ohio,
defendant A.E.R.O. sued ECI in Texas seeking indemnity. 228 After the Texas
trial court rejected ECI’s summary judgment motion under Wisconsin law,
A.E.R.O. later won a judgment for costs in the Wisconsin suit.229 The Texas
court of appeals reversed and rendered in ECI’s favor, holding that under
Restatement sections 6, 145, and 173, Wisconsin law governed indemnity for
the Wisconsin lawsuit. 230
Janvey v. Suarez 231 illustrates a different Restatement presumption—that
unproven foreign law is the same as forum law. Janvey was an action by the
receiver for the Stanford Financial Group (Stanford) to recoup money
transferred to defendant Suarez, who was Stanford’s chief of staff. 232 On state
law claims for fraudulent transfer, Suarez argued for Florida law and plaintiffs
for Texas law.233 Suarez failed to supply the court with any evidence that Florida
law differed from Texas, and the court thus applied the presumption that
unproven foreign law is the same as that of the forum state. 234
Three other Survey-period cases applied Restatement presumptions favoring
the situs law of the tort after analyzing whether another state had a more
significant relationship: (1) Indiana products liability law compelled denial of
defendant’s summary judgment motion in a claim for a child’s fall from an
infant seat; 235 (2) Ohio law governed a slip-and-fall claim arising in Ohio but

222
. Id.
223. Ins. Co. of State of Pa. v. Neese, 407 S.W.3d 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).
224. Id. at 852.
225. Id. at 853–54.
226. Engine Components, Inc. v. A.E.R.O. Aviation Co., No. 04-10-00812-CV, 2012 WL
666648 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 29, 2012, pet. denied).
227. Id. at *1.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at *1–5.
231. Janvey v. Suarez, No. 3:10-CV-02581-N, 2013 WL 5663107 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17. 2013).
232. Id. at *1–2.
233. Id. at *2–3.
234. Id. at *3–4.
235. O’Neal v. Bumbo Int’l Trust, No. 6:11-CV-72, 2013 WL 4083281, at *2 (S.D. Tex., Aug.
1, 2013) (applying RESTATEMENT sections 6, 145, & 156 (presumption favoring situs law for
personal injury claims)).
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where the victim had treatment and ongoing injury at his home in Texas; 236 and
(3) Texas defamation law governed a Houston doctor’s claim based on a
disparaging email sent from Missouri to recipients in Missouri, Wisconsin, and
Texas. 237
C. FEDERAL CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
Federal common law has various choice-of-law rules for use in federal
question cases having a gap that requires using non-federal law. Bankruptcy law
has the “independent judgment rule” which provides that when bankruptcy
obligations involve claims arising under multiple states’ laws, the choice of
governing law “requires the exercise of an informed judgment in the balancing
of all the interests of the states with the most significant contacts in order best to
accommodate the equities among the parties to the policies of those states.” 238
This rule, however, is subject to circuit splits. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has
not decided in bankruptcy cases whether to use the independent judgment rule
or the forum state’s choice-of-law rule. 239 This conflict between these choice-oflaw rules was at issue in three cases during the Survey-period, all of which found
it to be a false conflict. That is, federal common law uses factors similar to and
sometimes interchangeable with those in the Restatement. The lack of a conflict
in these cases does not mean, however, that the differing circuit views will always
produce the same result.
In re Mirant Corp. 240was an action by the debtor to avoid guaranties made in a
failed venture. The basis for the guaranty avoidance was fraudulent transfer. 241
The debtor company was based in Georgia but the lenders were not. 242 The
bankruptcy court concluded that New York law governed, but the federal district
court reversed under an independent-judgment-rule analysis (using Restatement
sections 6 and 145) that Georgia law had the stronger interest. 243 Georgia law
favored the lenders and the trial court dismissed the debtor’s claims. 244 The
Fifth Circuit reversed, noting that the intangible nature of the injury minimized
the relevance of the section 145 factors which are (1) the injury situs, (2) the
injury-causing conduct situs, (3) the parties’ domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation, and place of business, and (4) the place where the
parties’ relationship is centered. 245 The court held instead that the injury’s
236. Hooper v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-5078-G, 2013 WL 5786294, at *2–6 (N.D.
Tex. Oct. 28, 2013) (applying RESTATEMENT sections 6, 145, & 156 (presumption favoring situs
law for personal injury claims)).
237. Tyson v. Austin Eating Disorders Partners, LLC, No. A-13-CA-180-SS, 2013 WL 3197641,
at *1, *5–6 (W.D. Tex. June 21, 2013).
238. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161–62 (1946).
239. See MC Asset Recovery LLC v. Commerzbank A.G. (In Re Mirant Corp.), 675 F.3d 530,
537 (5th Cir. 2012).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 532.
242. Id. at 532, 538
243. MC Asset Recovery LLC v. Commerzbank A.G., 441 B.R. 791, 810–12 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2010).
244. Id. at 804–12.
245. In re Mirant, 675 F.3d at 537–38 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 145 (1971)).
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intangible nature made the section 145 factors difficult to assess and should
yield to the policy of helping injured parties rather than deterring conduct. 246
The court accordingly turned to the broader balancing factors in Restatement
section 6 which pointed to New York law.247 Two other Survey opinions noted
the similarity of the two bankruptcy conflicts rules in choosing North Carolina
law over those of Delaware, Texas, and Georgia in a wrongful distribution
claim, 248 and Texas rather than Colorado law in a fraudulent transfer claim. 249
Another federal-common-law rule arose to defeat a third-party claim in a
criminal forfeiture action. United States v. 2004 Ferrari 360 Modeno 250 was the
forfeiture of a car seized in a conspiracy to pass counterfeit money. Evens
Claude came from Pennsylvania to Houston and bought the car that was later
seized after his arrest for possession of counterfeit money. 251 When the
government filed an in rem action to seize the car, Claude’s mother, Josette
Claude, intervened to claim an ownership interest even though her name was
not on the title.252 She argued that Texas law controlled as the site of the seizure,
and under Texas law she was an innocent bailee because the money used for the
car was hers. 253 The court noted that Texas no longer recognized a joint-venture
corporate form that could establish bailment.254 Pennsylvania law, however, did
recognize that form. 255 On the issue of ownership interest, the court held that
Pennsylvania law governed under a federal-common-law choice-of-law rule that
the law of the jurisdiction creating the property right determines a claimant’s
legal interest 256 and that Claude’s claim failed because her son was the car’s only
legal owner.257 On Claude’s second claim based on bailment, the court found a
false conflict between Texas and Pennsylvania law, both defeating Claude’s
claim. 258
W & T Offshore, Inc. v. Apache Corp. 259 is a well-done analysis of the complex
federal choice-of-law rule for non-federal claims arising under the Outer
Continental Shelf Land Act (OCSLA). 260 W & T alleged that Apache breached
a production handling agreement by misallocating oil from W & T’s Gulf
platforms, including instances of fraud and related state-law torts by
misrepresenting those allocations. 261 For the state law claims, the OCSLA directs
246. Id. at 537.
247. Id. at 537–38 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. c (1971)
and remanding to the district court for application of New York law).
248. Crescent Res. Litig. Trust v. Duke Energy Corp., 500 B.R. 464, 483 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
2013).
249. Feuerbacher v. Moser, No. 4:11-CV-272, 2012 WL 1070138, at *9–10 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29,
2012).
250. United States v. 2004 Ferrari 360 Modeno, 902 F. Supp. 2d 944 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
251. Id. at 948.
252. Id. at 947–48.
253. Id. at 948–49.
254. Id. at 953.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 953–54.
258. Id. at 955–57.
259. W & T Offshore, Inc. v. Apache Corp., 918 F. Supp. 2d 601 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
260. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) (2012).
261. W & T Offshore, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
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that such claims be controlled by the law of the adjacent state, which are
incorporated into federal common law for the purposes of that case. 262 To fall
under this rule, the torts must be committed on a fixed platform anchored to
the seabed. 263 The court did a lengthy analysis of the function of the OCSLA
choice-of-law rule and the case law confusion surrounding the concept of where
the events occurred, giving rise to the claims.264 The court found that in spite of
the lack of clear direction from precedent, the events giving rise to the claims
occurred sufficiently on the fixed platform to point to the application of
Louisiana law as surrogate federal law. 265
D. OTHER CHOICE-OF-LAW ISSUES
Taylor v. Tesco Corp. (US) 266 offered an informative example of the need to
apply another state’s choice-of-law methodology. The action was for a worker’s
injuries on an oil rig off the coast of Mexico, originally filed in federal court in
Louisiana and transferred on an inconvenient forum motion to the Southern
District of Texas. 267 Such intra-federal transfers of diversity cases require the
transferee court to apply the transferor court’s choice-of-law rule. 268 The issue
here was a motion to sever by various insurers which was opposed by the
primary defendants. 269 The opinion is a good application of Louisiana’s
comparative impairment choice-of-law test, and also illustrates the function of a
choice-of-law analysis in a motion to sever. 270
The choice-of-law function generally applies to substantive legal matters and
not procedure, which is generally governed by forum law. Two
Survey-period
cases reach opposite but correct results in the substance/procedure dichotomy,
both considering attorney fees. Man Industries (India) Ltd. v. Midcontinent Express
Pipeline, LLC 271 was a series of claims, counterclaims, and crossclaims among
parties to a pipeline purchase agreement, along with the bank which financed
the agreement. One issue was the bank’s request for attorney fees and expenses
after prevailing on its declaratory judgment action that it had not wrongfully
dishonored a letter of credit. 272 Plaintiff Man Industries argued that New York
law, which governed the letter of credit, did not provide for attorney fees. 273
Both the trial and appellate courts disagreed, holding that the bank’s
262. Id. at 609–10.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 609–14.
265. Id. at 613–14. For a more straightforward application based on simpler facts, see In re
Seahawk Drilling, Inc., No. 11-20089, 2012 WL 1123864, at *2–4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 30,
2012); SM Energy Co. v. Smackco, Ltd., No. 11-cv-3028, 2012 WL 4760841, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
5, 2012).
266. Taylor v. Tesco Corp. (US), No. H-11-00517, 2012 WL 4470461 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26,
2012).
267. Id. at *1.
268. Id. at *3 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243 n.8 (1981)).
269. Id. at *1.
270. Id. at *3 (applying LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3537 (2011)).
271. Man Indus. (India) Ltd. v. Midcontinent Express Pipeline, LLC, 407 S.W.3d 342 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).
272. Id. at 345–46.
273. Id. at 354–55.
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entitlement to fees was based on the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act,
that is, the issue was a matter of forum procedure and not based on substantive
law. 274
HealthTronics Inc. v. Lisa Laser USA, Inc. 275 held in contrast that California law
governed the issue of admissibility of evidence to prove attorney fees in a
contract dispute. The court explained that although forum law ordinarily
governs procedure, another state’s law is appropriate if “the primary purpose of
the relevant rule of the state of the otherwise applicable law is to affect decision
of the issue rather than to regulate the conduct of the trial.” 276
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments from other states and countries create Texas conflict-oflaws issues in two ways: (1) their local enforcement, 277 and (2) their preclusive
effect on local lawsuits. Page limits preclude any detailed discussion beyond brief
statements of holdings of the more notable foreign judgment cases in the twentyfour month Survey-period.
A. SISTER-STATE JUDGMENTS
Liberty Bank, F.S.B. v. Etter 278 is an interesting example of rejecting
enforcement of an earlier judgment based on subsequent collateral judgment.
Etter leased telecommunications equipment from NonVergence who then
assigned the lease to Liberty Bank. 279 The equipment was faulty and Etter ceased
payments, leading to Liberty Bank obtaining an Iowa judgment against Etter for

274. Id. at. 352–55; see also Thygesen v. Strange, Nos. 14-09-00866-CV:4-10-0324-CV, 2013 WL
2247381, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 21, 2013, pet. denied) (holding entitlement
to jury trial controlled by forum law and not Delaware law) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 129 (1971)).
275. HealthTronics Inc. v. Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 382 S.W.3d 567 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no
pet.).
276. Id. at 579 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 133 (1971)).
277. Texas recognizes two methods of enforcing foreign judgments: the common-law method
using the foreign judgment as the basis for a local lawsuit, and since 1981, the more direct
procedure under the two uniform judgments acts. The underlying mandate for the common-law
enforcement is the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1,
and its statutory counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act specifically reserves the common-law method as an alternative. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (West 2008). Under the two uniform acts, sister-state judgments are
enforced under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA). TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001–.003 (West 2008), 35.004 (West Supp. 2013), 35.005–.008 (West
2008). Foreign-country judgments for money are enforced under the Uniform Foreign Country
Money-Judgments Recognition Act (UFCMJRA). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001–
.008 (West 2008). Texas laws also provide for enforcement of (1) arbitration awards (Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2012)); Texas International Arbitration Act (TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 172.082(f) (West 2011)); (2) child custody decisions (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 152.303 (West 2008)); and (3) child support awards (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.601 (West
2008)). Federal judgments may be enforced in any other federal district as local judgments. See 28
U.S.C. § 1963 (2012). Federal judgments may also be enforced as sister-state judgments in Texas
state courts. See id. § 1963.
278. Liberty Bank, F.S.B. v. Etter, No. 02-12-00337-CV, 2013 WL 5302719 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth, Sept. 19, 2013, pet. filed).
279. Id. at *1.

128

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 1

the defaulted lease. 280 In the meantime, the Texas Attorney General brought a
consumer action against NonVergence and obtained a judgment nullifying
Etter’s and other consumers’ leases. 281 When Liberty Bank sought to enforce the
Iowa judgment in Texas, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s rejection
of the Iowa judgment based on the Attorney General’s intervening judgment. 282
Two Survey-period cases involved judgment debtors’ attempted relitigation of
personal jurisdiction in the judgment-rendering state. In Peters v. Top Gun
Executive Group, 283 Houston-based Top Gun had contracted with New Jersey
resident Peters to assist in job searches in New York and New Jersey. Peters
eventually sued Top Gun in a New Jersey court for breach of contract, fraud,
and related claims, and Top Gun defaulted. 284 When Peters attempted
enforcement in Texas, the Texas trial court rejected the New Jersey judgment,
finding that Top Gun was not subject to New Jersey jurisdiction in its contract
to assist a New Jersey resident in finding employment in New Jersey or New
York. 285 The Texas court of appeals reversed and rendered after conducting a
detailed review of the trial record’s recitation of Top Gun’s contacts and the
resulting jurisdiction under the New Jersey long-arm statute and due process.286
The court conducted a similar analysis in Chaseekhalili v. Cinemacar Leasing, Inc.
to affirm the trial court’s finding that New York had personal jurisdiction over
judgment debtor, based on proper service of process leading to default
judgment.287
In other cases, Texas courts of appeal refused a North Carolina probate
court’s determination of a will’s validity, based on Texas’s exclusive jurisdiction
over the decedent’s real property in Texas; 288 and affirmed the enforcement of
an Indiana judgment, rejecting the judgment debtor’s challenge that proper
authentication required certification on every page. 289
B. FOREIGN COUNTY JUDGMENTS
New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Magellan Reinsurance Co. 290 was a judgment
from the Turks and Caicos Islands for reimbursement of fees and costs in New
Hampshire. Pursuant to Magellan’s business wind up in the Turks and Caicos
Islands, New Hampshire Insurance Company (NHIC) filed a claim. 291 After
280. Id. at *2.
281. Id.
282. Id. at *2–5.
283. Peters v. Top Gun Exec. Grp., 396 S.W.3d 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no
pet.).
284. Id. at 60.
285. Id. at 60–61.
286. Id. at 60–61, 72.
287. Chaseekhalili v. Cinemacar Leasing, Inc., No. 02-11-00454-CV, 2012 WL 3207247, at *1–
3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 9, 2012, pet. denied).
288. Haga v. Thomas, 409 S.W.3d 731, 732–33, 738 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet.
filed).
289. Whitehead v. Bulldog Battery Corp., 400 S.W.3d 115, 116–19 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013,
pet denied).
290. N.H. Ins. Co. v. Magellan Reinsurance Co., No. 02-11-00334-CV, 2013 WL 105654 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Jan. 10, 2013, pet. denied).
291. Id. at *1.
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several stages of litigation, NHIC lost and was assessed fees and costs for the
litigation. 292 Magellan filed its Turks and Caicos Islands judgment in a state
court in Fort Worth where the trial court approved enforcement over NHIC’s
objection that the foreign judgment was for a penalty and thus improper.293 The
trial court disagreed and found instead that it was a proper money judgment
enforceable in Texas, and the court of appeals affirmed. 294 In Presley v. N.V.
Masureel Veredeling, the court enforced a Belgian judgment, rejecting the
judgment debtor’s argument that the Belgian court improperly ignored an
arbitration clause. 295
C. PRECLUSION
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. 296 is an
interesting and well-reasoned application of full faith and credit to a
Massachusetts court’s application of Illinois law to interpret an insurance policy.
The Massachusetts case was for asbestos liability, with subsequent litigation in
Texas for reimbursement of Chicago Bridge’s litigation expenses. 297 The Texas
trial court granted Chicago Bridge’s motion for partial summary judgment based
on issue preclusion of coverage issues litigated in Massachusetts.298 The insurer
appealed, arguing that the issues in the Texas reimbursement case differed on
several points. 299 In a meticulous analysis of the identity of the issues and other
preclusion elements, the court of appeals rejected this argument and affirmed
the trial court’s ruling. 300
In other Survey-period cases, a Texas court of appeals applied claim
preclusion to find that plaintiff’s prior arbitration in Kentucky was dispositive of
her claim in Texas for breach of fiduciary duty regarding estate distributions, 301
and two federal district courts held that (1) prior Colorado litigation of the
accounting for the insurance policy deductible precluded relitigation between
insurer and insured in a subsequent Texas action for reimbursement of
litigation costs; 302 and the fraud issue decided in Colorado litigation did not
preclude relitigation in Texas because the Colorado default judgment did not
meet the actually-litigated requirement. 303

292. Id. at *1–2.
293. Id. at *2, *11.
294. Id. at *3–11.
295. Presley v. N.V. Masureel Veredeling, 370 S.W.3d 425, 431, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
296. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 406 S.W.3d 326
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. denied).
297. Id. at 329–30.
298. Id. at 330.
299. Id. at 332.
300. Id.
301. Wall v. Orr, No. 05-12-00369-CV, 2013 WL 3956664, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 30,
2013, pet. denied).
302. Trammell Crow Residential Co. v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co, No. 3:10-CV-2163-B, 2012 WL
4174898, at *7–8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2012).
303. Alan Bau Invs. V. Horne (In re Horne), No. 10-42625, 2012 WL 1205796, at *4 (Bankr.
E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2012).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The 2012 Survey’s conclusion noted that Texas courts would need to reassess
their calculation for stream-of-commerce and general jurisdiction. 304 In this
Survey-period, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its pro-jurisdiction
application of stream-of-commerce jurisdiction with a convincing distinction of
the volume-sale facts in Ainsworth from the far narrower facts in McIntyre. 305 In
choice of law, the Survey-period showed an ongoing tendency toward two
trends—the unfortunate acceptance of choice-of-law clauses without the required
scrutiny, 306 and a healthy trend toward an ever-increasing sophistication in
applying the many aspects of Restatement analysis, particularly in tort law, a
practice which adds stability and predictability to the otherwise seemingly openended balancing factors of the most significant relationship test. 307 Overall, the
two-year Survey-period showed the ongoing breadth and depth, much of it
omitted from this report, of conflict of laws as a pervasive feature of Texas
adjudication.

304.
305.
306.
307.

See George et al., supra note 5 at 421.
See supra notes 5–20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 153–65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 213–37 and accompanying text.

